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REFORMING THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
CODE: WHERE THE CLEAR COMMISSION
STOPPED SHORT OF ITS GOALS
TERRI L. MASCHERIN, ANDREW VAIL, AND JENNIFER L. DLUGOSZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine being sent to jail for having consensual sex with
another unmarried adult or for exhibiting artwork that depicts the
United States flag or for selling a video without a rating on the
cover. All of that conduct is punishable by imprisonment under
the current Illinois Criminal Code. If two unmarried adults have
consensual intercourse with one another, they could face
imprisonment for up to six months.' The exhibition of the State

* Terri L. Mascherin is a Partner in Jenner & Block LLP's Chicago Office.
Ms. Mascherin is a member of the Firm's Litigation Department and
Telecommunications, Arbitration: Domestic and International, Intellectual
Property, and Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition Practices.
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Mascherin represents clients in trials, appeals and regulatory appeals in state
and federal courts throughout the United States. She has first-chaired jury
and bench trials in both civil and criminal cases and argued appeals in both
state and federal court, and has arbitrated domestic and international
disputes.
Ms. Mascherin served as a Commissioner to the CLEAR
Commission. Ms. Mascherin received her J.D. from Northwestern University
School of Law, cum laude, in 1984, where she graduated Order of the Coif.
Andrew W. Vail is an Associate in Jenner & Block LLP's Chicago
Office. Mr. Vail has litigated a wide variety of complex cases, including both
civil and criminal cases. Mr. Vail also works closely with senior partner
Thomas P. Sullivan on reforms to the criminal justice system, including state
governments, bar associations and often speaks at national conferences on the
issue of criminal justice reform. He spent nearly two years assisting Ms.
Mascherin with her work on the CLEAR Commission. Mr. Vail received his
J.D. from University of Illinois School of Law, cum laude, in 2003.
Jennifer L. Dlugosz is an Associate in Jenner & Block LLP's Chicago
Office. Ms. Dlugosz is a member of the Firm's Litigation Department. Prior to
joining the Firm, Ms. Dlugosz served as a Staff Attorney for the CLEAR
Initiative. As a Staff Attorney for the CLEAR Initiative, Ms. Dlugosz assisted
in researching and drafting recommendations for the CLEAR Commission.
Ms. Dlugosz received her J.D. from Chicago-Kent College of Law, with high
honors, in 2006, where she graduated Order of the Coif.
1. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-8 (2006).
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flag or the United States flag with any word, figure, mark, or
design placed on it can result in thirty days of jail time. 2 Anyone
who sells or even rents a video movie that does not clearly display
3
an official rating faces thirty days imprisonment.
The Illinois Criminal Code includes several provisions that
are outdated, unconstitutional, or plainly unnecessary. Those
statutes clutter the Code and weaken its credibility, and the
CLEAR Commission should have recommended that the Illinois
legislature repeal them. Since the Criminal Code's last revision in
1961, the legislature not only has failed to repeal many outdated,
unconstitutional, and unnecessary laws, it has also expanded the
Code to add more criminal laws of questionable utility and
constitutionality. 4 This has created an inefficient and confusing
Code. The CLEAR Commission set out to clean up the Code - to
make it more efficient and less confusing.
Despite the
Commission's work, even if the legislature accepts all of its
recommendations, the Illinois Criminal Code will continue to
contain several inappropriate statutes because the Commission
failed to grapple with their repeal.
A criminal code should provide clear notice of what conduct
the State prohibits. A code should be reserved for addressing
behavior that society seriously seeks to deter and for offenses that
truly are prosecuted. A code should be logical and reasonably
understandable. Many criminal codes, including the Illinois Code,
fail to achieve those goals and contain nonsensical, duplicative,
and unnecessary laws.5 Criminal law scholars generally agree
that legislatures are no longer simply passing necessary and
essential legislation "but rather have become 'offense factories'
churning out more and more narrow, unnecessary, and often
counterproductive new offenses." 6 Those scholars argue that the

2. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/1 (2006).
3. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 395/3 (2006).

4. The 1961 Criminal Code contained 33 articles. In 2007, the Illinois
Criminal Code contained 47 articles in addition to more than 80 separate acts
creating other offenses.
5. For example, the federal criminal code has ballooned to contain over
4,000 crimes. GENE HEALY, Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF

ALMOST EVERYTHING vii (Gene Healy ed., Cato Institute 2004); see also Erik
Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, XXV CATO POLICY REPORT No. 6, 1,
15-16
(2003),
available
at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/
policy.report/v25n6/luna.pdf (discussing the effects of expanding criminal
codes, giving examples of unnecessary criminal laws and providing the costs of
over-criminalization).
6. See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating
Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 634 (2005)
(discussing problems with the trend of criminal code expansion in the United
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churning trend is fueled by legislators' fear of appearing soft on
crime. 7 The reforms to streamline the Illinois Code that took place
over forty years ago have been weakened by the growing trend of
adding more and more laws to the Criminal Code with each
8
passing legislative session.
Legislators need to be more vigilant when reviewing
proposals to create new crimes du jour. Perhaps, as the scholars
suggest, they are reluctant to do so because of real or perceived
pressure not to be seen as being soft on crime. A 2003 Cato Policy
Report noted that "[e]xperience has shown that being tough on
crime wins elections, and a sure-fire way to look tough is to add a
superfluous carjacking statute or boost the penalty for drug
dealers, irrespective of the statute's normative justification or
ultimate effect on society."9 But, piecemeal enactment of criminal
statutes inevitably impairs the clarity of the Code. Regardless of
the cause of the proliferation of unnecessary laws in the Code,
those laws should be repealed to better ensure that Illinois has a
logical, concise, and consistent criminal code.
Illinois' criminal laws were first codified in 1819. In 1961, the
Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois Criminal Code changed the
Criminal Code, with the goal of creating a unified criminal code. 10
Although the Code had a chapter dedicated to criminal laws prior
to 1961, the criminal laws of Illinois had been scattered
throughout 148 chapters of statutes." The 1961 revision achieved
its purpose; it compiled criminal legislation in one location and
streamlined its provisions. Since then, the Code has swollen in
size. In 2007, the Code contained forty-seven articles and over
eighty acts. 12 In 2004, the CLEAR Commission took on the task of

States).
7. Id. at 644.
8. Id. at 635.
9. Luna, supra note 5, at 16.
10. 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. XIX, Committee Forewardto Tentative Final Draft of
the Proposed Illinois Revised Criminal Code of 1961 (West 1989).
The
Presidents of the Chicago Bar Association and the Illinois Bar Association
appointed the Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois Criminal Code. The
Committee consisted of sixteen members including lawyers, judges,
prosecuting attorneys and law professors.
11. 38 ILL. ANN. STAT. XX.
12. Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 720, Criminal Offenses, houses the
criminal laws of the State. "Chapter 720 reflects no less than eighty-two
Articles and Acts, with the principal measures such as homicide, kidnapping
and theft in the Criminal Code of 1961 (Act 5) followed by a plethora of other
Acts, many of which are similar to or overlap with offenses in Act 5." CLEAR
Commission, Proposed Combined Commentary to the CLEAR Criminal Code
Recommendation 1 (May 25, 2007) (unpublished paper, on file with CLEAR
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updating the Illinois Criminal Code. This Article examines areas
where the Commission should have gone further to complete its
task.
The authors believe that to make the Code more fair and to
limit the Code to include laws that are likely to be enforced, the
CLEAR Commission should have taken further action to clarify
the Illinois Criminal Code in three main areas. First, the CLEAR
Commission should have recommended the repeal of outdated
statutes that remain in Code. The retention of outdated statutes
that are never enforced undermines society's confidence in the
criminal justice system, as the public knows that some provisions
in the Code simply will not be enforced. An ideal criminal code
should reflect the norms of modern society and include laws that
society cares to enforce. Second, this Article addresses statutes
that unlawfully curtail free speech and personal liberties. The
retention of those likely unconstitutional statutes in the Code
lessens its credibility. Finally, this Article argues that laws based
on isolated, exceptional incidents - and solely motivated by
political reasons - should be eliminated from the Code. Provisions
that have never been and likely never will be enforced do not serve
any useful purpose. Several of those laws essentially serve to
regulate consumer products, which is not the purpose of a criminal
code. Addressing those three areas of the Criminal Code, as
discussed below, would eliminate inappropriate criminal laws and
better achieve the Commission's objectives.
II. A Criminal Code Should Be Up To Date
A criminal code should reflect the current values of the
society it serves. To achieve that objective, the State must
occasionally update its code. The CLEAR Commission took
several steps to bring the Illinois Code up to date, 13 but more

Commission Staff).
13. The CLEAR Commission recommended that the following outdated

statutes be repealed: the Party Line Emergency Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
660/01-4 (2006), Barratry, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-11 (2006), and
The Party Line
Maintenance, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12 (2006).
Emergency Act prohibits "wilfully refus[ing] to yield or surrender the use of a
party line to another person for the purpose of permitting such other person to
report a fire or summon police, medical or other aid in case of emergency." 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 660/2. The offense of barratry is committed when a person,
"wickedly and willfully excites and stirs up actions or quarrels between the
people of this State with a view to promote strife and contention." 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/32-11. The offense of maintenance is committed when a person,
"officiously intermeddles in an action that in no way belongs to or concerns
that person, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or
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changes should have been recommended to modernize the
Criminal Code. Retention of outdated provisions neither advances
the Commission's goals of clarity and conciseness nor enhances the
credibility of the Code. Two examples of outdated statutes that
the CLEAR Commission kept in its final recommendation are the
crimes of adultery and fornication. This Section discusses the
history and purposes of those laws, how other states have repealed
them, and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that calls
into question their constitutionality. It demonstrates that the
Illinois adultery and fornication statutes are outdated, unenforced,
and likely unconstitutional. The CLEAR Commission should have
urged their repeal.
The offense of adultery is committed when two adults engage
in open and notorious sexual intercourse and at least one of them
is married. 14 The married person(s) always commits the offense; if
one of the offenders is not married, the law requires that the
unmarried offender know that the other person is married. 15 A
violation of that statute is punishable by imprisonment for up to
16
one year, a fine of up to $2,500, or both.
The offense of fornication is committed when any person has
open and notorious sexual intercourse with a person who is not his
or her spouse.1 7 A violation of that statute is punishable by
imprisonment for up to six months, a fine of up to $1,500, or
both.18 Fornication is distinct from adultery because it is not
necessary that either party be married for an offense to be
committed.
American adultery and fornication laws stem from Puritan
influence in Colonial America. 19 Adultery was not a criminal
offense in England.
The American Colonies initially made
adultery a capital offense. Later, the punishment was lessened to
whipping, flogging, branding, and, infamously, wearing a scarlet
letter "A."
Today, about half of the states still criminalize
20
adultery, and nine criminalize sex between unmarried persons.

otherwise, to prosecute or defend the action, with a view to promote litigation."
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-12.
14. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (2006).
15. Id.
16. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-3(a)(1); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-9-1(a)(2).
17. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-8(a) (2006).
18. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-3(a)(2) (2006); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-91(a)(3) (2006).
19. Jeffrey R. Cohen, A Vote for DecriminalizingAdultery, 217 N.Y. L.J. NO.
20, 1 (Jan. 30, 1997).
20. Joseph Trybor & Jerry Thornton, Alleged Trist Revives Rare Adultery
Law, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1997, at Metro, 1.
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The Illinois laws criminalizing adultery and fornication date back
to the 1800s. The fact that the Illinois Criminal Code still
contains them - nearly 200 years later - is puzzling.
The creation of the 1961 Illinois Criminal Code resulted in
amendments to the adultery and fornication statutes rather than
repeal, despite a trend in other states at that time to abolish those
statutes. The most significant change made to the adultery and
fornication statutes during the 1961 revision was the creation of a
21
distinction between the penalties for adultery and fornication.
The 1961 Criminal Code Commissioners considered adultery to be
a more serious crime than fornication because, they concluded,
adultery was an affront to marital relationships and, more
seriously, offended public peace. 22 The Commentary to the 1961
Code also noted that adultery might pose a danger to society
because of the possibility that an enraged spouse would seek
vengeance for the offense. 23 Today, adultery continues to be
punished one grade more severely than fornication.
The
Commentary also highlighted the retention of the "open and
notorious" provision in the fornication statutes, acknowledging
that the purpose of the statutes was not to criminalize matters of
"principally private moral concern." 24 The key concerns behind the
adultery statute were "the scandalousness, the affront to public
decency and the marital institution." Therefore, both the sexual
intercourse or cohabitation and the absence of a marital
25
relationship must be open and notorious.
There is no recent case law evidencing any prosecutions for
adultery and fornication in Illinois. A 2002 newspaper article
reports that no one has been prosecuted for adultery in Illinois in
the last forty years. 26 And over ten years ago, a spokesperson for
the Office of the Cook County State's Attorney told the Chicago
Tribune that the Office would not prosecute adultery offenses:
"We're not going to get into charging adultery in Cook County. As
prosecutors, we have to decide where we are going to apply the
resources. The courts are already full."27 He continued, "For the

21. See 38 ILL. STAT. ANN. 11-7 (West 1979) (Commentary to the 1961
Criminal Code and revised by Charles H. Bowman in 1972).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Dan Savage, Swingers: A LOVE STORY; What "Pro-Family" Advocates
Won't Tell You About the Couples Who Happily Share Each Other With
Strangers, CHI. READER, Oct. 18, 2002, at 1.

27. Joseph Trybor & Jerry Thornton, Devine Won't Prosecute Adultery
Case; Enforcing Law Seen as Problematic, Costly, CHI. TRIB., July 12, 1997, at
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most part, adultery cases can be handled differently. It's a
relationship problem. It's not an uncommon phenomenon in
today's society. It's a behavior, and we're not going to go after it."28
Indeed, prosecution for those offenses would be a waste of society's
time and resources. In an adultery or fornication case, where the
criminal behavior has likely occurred behind closed doors,
prosecutors would be hard-pressed to prove a case and doing so

would involve an invasion into the privacy of people's homes.
While those offenses have not been prosecuted in Illinois in
many years, the police occasionally arrest persons for the offenses.
The charges are then either dropped or a different offense is
charged. For example, in 1997, Harvey police arrested a couple for
fornication who were found having sex in a car that was viewable
to nearby residents. 29 Prosecutors later changed the charges to
public indecency. 30 Earlier that same year, Harvey police charged
two others with adultery when a husband came home and found
his wife in bed with another man. 31 The State declined to
prosecute the offenses. A representative for the Cook County
State's Attorney's office stated that fornication is a seldom-used
charge because it could "conceivably be leveled against people in
the privacy of their own homes." 32

The representative further

stated that the State's Attorney's office should focus on murders,
33
assaults, and other violent crimes.
The reported Illinois cases enforcing the adultery and
fornication statutes are outdated and downright silly by modern
standards. They provide no support for the proposition that those
laws should be retained. In an 1852 fornication case, the court
stated that the purpose of prohibiting fornication was to "prohibit
the public scandal and disgrace of the living together of persons of
opposite sexes notoriously in illicit intimacy, which outrages public
decency, having a demoralizing and debasing influence upon
society. ' 34 In People v. Potter, a 1943 adultery case, the trial court
found that the defendant had sex with a married but separated
woman and sentenced the defendant to one year at a state penal

5.
28. Id.
29. Philip Franchine, Pair Charged with Having Sex in Car, CHI. SUNTIMES, July 18, 1997, at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Searls v. People, 13 Ill. 597, 598 (1852).
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farm. 35 The court noted that the defendant's conviction was
appropriate because his largely "immoral life was so brazen and
notorious that every neighbor was cognizant of it."36 The Potter
court stated that the purpose of the adultery and fornication
statutes was not to control private immoral behavior but rather to
"conserve the public morals by the prevention of indecent and evil
examples tending to debase and demoralize society and degrade
the institution of marriage."37 In modern times, that behavior
does not elicit the public outcry that it may have caused in the
1800s, or even in the 1940s.
Moreover, the adultery and
fornication statutes hardly conserve public morals given that they
are not enforced. While the preservation of marriage may be
important to society, that aim should not be achieved through
Nor do the statutes serve any legitimate
criminal sanction.
deterrent purpose, given that the most recent reported decision
applying either statute is over fifty years old.
The elimination of adultery and fornication from the Criminal
Code would not foreclose punishment for lewd behavior. Offensive
public sexual activity is punishable under other criminal statutes.
Public indecency criminalizes the performance of sex acts in
public. 38 The penalty for public indecency - imprisonment for less
than one year - is the same as the penalty for adultery. Given
that the behavior most offensive to society would still be
punishable under the public indecency statute, the elimination of
the outdated adultery and fornication statutes from the Code
would not have a significant impact on either the deterrence or
punishment of offensive public conduct.
Illinois is behind the times in failing to repeal its adultery
and fornication statutes.
At one point, many American
jurisdictions punished consensual sexual acts between two
unmarried adults. However, since 1955, when the American Law
Institute drafted the Model Penal Code, which did not include
those statutes, the trend in the states has been to repeal adultery
and fornication laws. Following promulgation of the Model Penal
Code, many states sought to revise their criminal codes and looked
to the Model Code for guidance. The Commentary to the Model
Penal Code noted that the drafters purposely omitted the adultery
and fornication statutes because they did not believe that the
statutes' purpose, to punish those who violate the community's
standards of ethical behavior, was enough to justify penal

35. People v. Potter, 49 N.E.2d 307, 308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943).

36. Id. at 310.
37. Id. at 309.
38. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9 (2006).

2008]

The CriminalLaw Edit, Alignment and Reform Initiative

749

sanctions. 39 The Commentary also noted that adultery and
fornication laws generally had gone unenforced for quite some
time. 40 The Institute wrote that when unenforced statutes are left
in a code there is a potential for abuse through selective
prosecution. 41 When those statutes remain on the books, there is a
risk that they will be invoked, for example, to harass persons of
different races or political figures. 42 The Commentary further
stated that retaining but not enforcing these provisions could
bring the penal law into "disrepute."43 Given those concerns, and
the belief that law enforcement's scarce resources should be used
to prosecute crimes that directly harm other individuals, the
Model Penal Code drafters decided to exclude adultery and
44
fornication laws.
Following the promulgation of the Model Penal Code, several
states eliminated adultery and fornication statutes from their
criminal codes.
At least ten states, including California,
Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Jersey and Oregon, have repealed their adultery
statutes. 45 Likewise, seven states, Alabama, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island and Oregon, as well as

39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 note on adultery and fornication (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. At least nineteen states currently have laws criminalizing adultery:
Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ALA.
CODE § 13A-13-2 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408 (2006); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-6-501 (2006); FLA. STAT. § 798.01 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-19
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3507 (2006);
MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 272, § 14 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.29 (2004);
MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2006); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 645:3 (2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.17 (McKinney Supp. 2008);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2006); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09 (2006); OKLA.
STAT. TIT. 21, § 871-72 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-2 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-15-60 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-103 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2365 (2006); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 944.16 (2005).Alabama
retained its adultery statute, but the Commentary to that statute states,
'While there is strong sentiment that adultery should not be regulated by
criminal sanction, the committee was of the opinion that the political success
of a proposal formally to abolish this crime would, at the present time, be
doubtful." ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2, Commentary.
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Washington D.C., have repealed fornication statutes. 46
The
drafters of the Alabama Criminal Code further noted that this
behavior is not considered criminal in most of the United States or
47
the rest of the world.
Despite the trend to repeal adultery and fornication statutes,
some scholars have argued for their retention. They argue that
those laws serve to deter immoral conduct and promote public
health. Arguments for retention of fornication and adultery
statutes include a state's interest in preventing disease, reducing
48
extramarital births, and protecting the institution of marriage.
Furthermore, the proponents believe those laws shape societal
norms, condemn immorality, and serve "as a strong barrier to
action," regardless whether they are ever enforced. 49 One author
has even gone so far as to suggest that instead of repealing those
laws the public should be better informed of them, even if they are
not enforced, to send a message of societal disapproval and to
"driv[e] this immoral conduct underground."5 0
Those arguments are not persuasive. The facts are that few
people likely know adultery and fornication constitute criminal
behavior, 51 and that prosecutors in Illinois have not charged those
offenses in decades. Thus, any deterrent effect from those statutes
is likely a fiction. A law journal article correctly summarized the
issue:
Although modern society does not necessarily encourage adulterous
behavior, it also does not view extramarital sex as a crime against
the citizenry. Statistics indicate that a large part of that "citizenry"
has, at some point, committed adultery. Reports show that
approximately 50 percent of all husbands and 33-40 percent of all

46. States that continue to criminalize fornication include Georgia, Idaho,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 272, § 18 (2006); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2006); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-08 (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (2006); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-104 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3

(2006).
47. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-2, Commentary.
48. Traci Shallbetter Stratton, No More Messing Around: Substantive Due
Process Challenges to State Laws ProhibitingFornication,73 WASH. L. REV.
767, 797 (1998).
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. See Joanna Grossman, Virginia Strikes Down State FornicationLaw,
Jan. 25, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/01/25/grossman.
oldlaws/index.html (last visited August 18, 2008) (explaining that people do
not know fornication is a crime).

2008]

The CriminalLaw Edit, Alignment and Reform Initiative

751

wives have engaged in extramarital intercourse. In the younger
generations, the wives' percentage rises to that of the husbands'
overall. Obviously,
the deterrent effect of the adultery statute is
52
nonexistent.
Nor do the statutes advance any legitimate state interest.
The State's interests of protecting citizens from disease and out-ofwedlock births are not supported by the statutory text itself. The
statutes broadly prohibit all open and notorious sexual intercourse
with anyone who is not one's spouse. They do not distinguish
between healthy and unhealthy persons nor do they distinguish
between fertile and infertile persons. Thus, the statutes are
overbroad to the extent they are intended to advance those goals.
Not only are adultery and fornication statutes outdated and
unenforced, but they are also likely unconstitutional. Since the
1961 Code was adopted, there have been significant developments
in constitutional law surrounding the right to privacy. These
decisions call into question the constitutionality of adultery and
fornication statutes that remain on the books, including Illinois'
statutes. The constitutional concerns that the adultery and
fornication statutes present today were not evident in 1961 when
Illinois last revised its Criminal Code.
Supreme Court decisions over the past half-century have
recognized an individual's constitutional right to privacy. The
Court has placed limits on when states can constitutionally
regulate private behavior between two consenting adults.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed adultery and
fornication statutes, the Court has struck down similar laws, and
if a challenge were made to those statutes today, they would not
withstand the challenge.
The Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut
is the "most pertinent beginning point" for a discussion about the
Court's jurisprudence addressing an individual's constitutional
53
right to privacy in connection with personal sexual conduct.
Notably, the Illinois Code's 1961 revision took place four years
before Griswold.
In Griswold, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Connecticut law that prohibited the use of contraceptives or
assisting with the use of contraceptives. 54 Directors from a
Planned Parenthood league were convicted under that law for

52. See Cohen, supra note 19 (examining the reality of how many men and
women participate in extramarital affairs).
53. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
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giving "information, instruction, and medical advice to married
persons as to the means of preventing conception." 55 The directors
challenged the validity of the law under which they were convicted
as an unconstitutional infringement on their rights to privacy. 56
Connecticut argued that there is no right to privacy in the
57
Constitution.
The Supreme Court agreed with the directors, holding that
the Bill of Rights creates various "zones of privacy."58 The Court
explained, for example, that the First Amendment creates a zone
of privacy concerning the right of association; the Third
Amendment creates a zone of privacy prohibiting quartering
soldiers; the Fourth Amendment creates a zone of privacy against
unreasonable searches and seizures; and the Fifth Amendment
creates a zone of privacy against self-incrimination. 59 The Court
reasoned that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance." 60 It also determined that the
right to privacy predated the Bill of Rights. 61 The Court
determined that a zone of privacy existed concerning the use of
contraceptives by a husband and wife. 62 That ruling "placed
emphasis on the marriage relation and the protected space of the
marital bedroom." 63 Griswold, therefore, set precedent that a
married couple's decision whether to use contraceptives during
sexual intercourse is a protected, private act but it did not
expressly extend that privacy right outside of the marital
64
relationship.
Less than ten years later, however, the Court recognized that
the right to privacy extends to the use of contraceptives by
unmarried persons. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court invalidated
a
Massachusetts
statute
that
prohibited
distributing
contraceptives to unmarried persons. 65 While Eisenstadt was
decided on Equal Protection grounds, the Court recognized, with
respect to unmarried persons, the "fundamental proposition that

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 485.

63. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
64. Id.

65. 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
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the law impaired the exercise of their personal rights."66 The
Court expressly noted: 'If the right of privacy means anything, it
is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted
governmental
intrusion
into
matters
so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."67 The Court also quoted Stanley v. Georgia,
stating "'also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy."' 68 While Eisenstadt merely applied the Court's
holding in Griswold to unmarried persons pursuant to the dictates
of the Equal Protection Clause, the decision reconfirmed that the
Constitution provides a right to privacy relating to sexual conduct
outside of the marital relationship.
Following Griswold and Eisenstadt, the next major Supreme
Court decision addressing a constitutional right to privacy was Roe
v. Wade.69 In Roe, the Court, for the first time, explained that the
Fourteenth Amendment also provides a protected zone of
privacy. 70 In Roe, an unmarried, pregnant woman who wished to
terminate her pregnancy challenged the constitutionality of a
Texas law that prohibited abortions except for the purpose of
saving the life of the mother.71 The Supreme Court, in one of its
most well-known and controversial decisions, struck down the
Texas law. 72
The Court gave a full explanation of the
underpinnings of the constitutional right to privacy. 73 First, it
recognized that although:
[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy
...the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution .... [T]he roots of that right [may be found] in the
First Amendment, in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the Ninth Amendment, or in the
concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
74
Amendment.

66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
67. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453 (internal citations omitted).

68. Id. at 454 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)
(internal quotations omitted).
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. Id. at 152-54.

71. Id. at 120.
72. Id. at 166.
73. Id. at 152-54.
74. Id. at 152 (internal citations omitted).
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Next, the Court made clear that "only personal rights that
can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
'75
It
liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.
then stated that "the right has some extension to activities
family
procreation, contraception,
relating to marriage,
relationships, and child rearing and education. '76 Specifically, the
"right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ...is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
Roe, therefore, continued the
terminate her pregnancy." 77
extension of the right to privacy outside of marriage and clarified
the constitutional bases for the right to privacy.
After Roe, the Court again confronted a sexual-privacy case
78
concerning contraceptives in Carey v. Population Services Int'l.
The Court held unconstitutional a New York law forbidding the
distribution of contraceptive devices to persons under sixteen
years of age. 79 The Court repeated its view on the constitutional
underpinnings of the right to privacy:
Although "[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy," the Court has recognized that one aspect of the "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendment is
"a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
of privacy."80
It then discussed the instances where a right to privacy had
been found to exist:
While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been
marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an
individual may make without unjustified government interference
are personal decisions "relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships and child rearing and
8
education." '
In Carey, the Court extended its holdings in Griswold and
Eisenstadt to minors.8 2 It confirmed that the right to privacy
protects against government intrusion into an individual's
decisions regarding procreation and contraception - two matters

75. Id. (internal citation omitted)
76. Id. at 152-53 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id. at 153.
78. Carey v. Population Serv. Intl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
79. Id. at 681-82.

80. Id. at 684-85 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 685 (internal citations omitted).
82. Id. at 691-99.
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directly relating to sexual conduct - and clarified that the
Fourteenth Amendment provides another basis for that
determination. 83 In addition, in a footnote, the Court stated that it
never before had "definitively answered the difficult question
whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state
84
statutes regulating [sexual] behavior among adults."
That question was considered in the 1986 decision Bowers v.
Hardwick, which addressed the constitutionality of the Georgia
sodomy statute.8 5 In Bowers, the Court declined to expand the
protection offered to personal decisions relating to sexual
conduct.8 6 A homosexual man who had been arrested for engaging
in sodomy "by committing that act with another adult male in the
bedroom of respondent's home" challenged the constitutionality of
the Georgia law.87 The Court upheld the statute.88 It found that
sodomy had been prohibited by criminal laws since ancient
times. 8 9 As far as constitutional protection, the Court held that
there is no protected right to engage in a particular sexual act. 90
Legal scholars criticized the Bowers decision and the Court itself
later observed that it had caused "uncertainty, for the precedents
before and after its issuance contradict[ed] its central holding."91
On that basis, Bowers should be viewed as an aberration in the
sexual-privacy line of cases rather than a link in their chain.
92
The Court overruled Bowers in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas.
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down a Texas sodomy
statute, reasoning that the liberty at stake concerned behavior
between two consenting adults, which is inherently private and
should not be subject to government intervention. 93 The Court
held that Bowers was incorrectly decided, and overruled Bowers's
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not include a fundamental right for homosexuals
to engage in consensual sodomy, even in the privacy of their own
homes.

94

In reaching its decision in Lawrence, the Court reviewed its

83. Idat 687-88.
84. Id. at 695 n.17.
85. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).

86. Id. at 195-96.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 195-96.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.; Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
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prior decisions defining the scope of liberty rights as they relate to
sexual conduct. 95 The Court stated that in the past half century
there had been "an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 96 The Court
emphasized that states should not define boundaries of personal
adult relationships when there is no risk of injury; adults should
be able to conduct their private lives within their own homes
without fear of criminal prosecution. 97 The Court stressed that the
conduct at issue was between two consenting adults who were
"entitled to respect for their private lives," and held that the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in that conduct
without intervention from the government. 98 The Court reasoned,
"our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our
own moral code." 99
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence striking
down the Texas sodomy statute, adultery and fornication statutes
would not withstand a constitutional challenge today. 10 0 Adultery
and fornication statutes, similar to sodomy statutes, seek to
regulate private consensual behavior between adults. A core
underpinning of the Court's decision in Lawrence is that
individuals have a right to engage in private sexual behavior in
their homes without government intrusion.10 1 Because adultery
and fornication statutes seek to regulate similar private
consensual behavior between adults, the statutes would not
survive scrutiny under Lawrence.
Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, states
had begun to question the constitutionality of their adultery and
fornication statutes. In 1994, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated, in dicta that the State's fornication statute
was of "doubtful constitutionality." 10 2 Prior to Lawrence, the
Supreme Court of Georgia recognized that its state constitution
protected private consensual sexual behavior between two adults,

95. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66.
96. Id. at 572.
97. Id. at 578.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 571 (quoting PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
100. Conversely, in Oliverson v. W Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1486-87
(D. Utah 1994), decided before the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence, the
District Court in Utah upheld an adultery statute, finding that an individual
does not have a privacy right to engage in extramarital relationships.
101. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
102. Att'y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994).
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and held the Georgia sodomy statute unconstitutional.
Since Lawrence, some state courts have held adultery and
fornication statutes unconstitutional. In 2005, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that its fornication statute was unconstitutional in
04
light of Lawrence.1
The court found that the statute infringed on
rights guaranteed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the statute criminalized private consensual
sexual behavior between adults. 105 In 2005, a North Dakota
district court judge issued a decision holding the state's adultery
and
state
under
the federal
statute
unconstitutional
constitutions. 106 While the judge cited to Lawrence, he based his
decision on the state and federal equal protection clauses, rather
than the Due Process Clause, because the state statute treated
10 7
similarly situated individuals differently.
In light of the decision in Lawrence, the trend in other states,
and the fact that adultery and fornication have been crimes in
name only for decades, the CLEAR Commission should have
recommended their repeal. Regulation of private morals should be
beyond the reach of the Criminal Code. The right of people to
engage in private, consensual, non-commercial sexual behavior is
quite clear after Lawrence. 0 s Maintaining statutes that are
unenforced, outdated, and potentially unconstitutional serves no
purpose but to clutter an already extensive criminal code.
The CLEAR Commission debated whether to recommend
repeal of the Illinois adultery and fornication statutes. The
Commission initially decided to recommend repeal. Once the
CLEAR Commission's entire recommendation was drafted,
however, concern was expressed that proposed repeal of those
statutes might be a political flashpoint and could generate
Ultimately, the CLEAR
opposition to the bill as a whole.
to retain
those
statutes in its
Commission decided
recommendation due to that political concern. The Commission
should have stuck to its initial recommendation. Legislators need
to be willing to take a stand and be prepared to make some
changes to the Criminal Code to ensure that it changes with the
times and passes constitutional muster. Adultery and fornication
laws are archaic and unconstitutional and their retention serves
no purpose.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 21-22 (Ga. 1998).
Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370-71 (Va. 2005).
Id.
State v. Penn, No. 09-4-K-3625-1 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2005).
Id. at 8-9.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
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III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAWS THAT INFRINGE UPON THE
RIGHT To FREE SPEECH Do NOT BELONG IN THE CODE

Unconstitutional laws should not be in the Criminal Code
because they are unenforceable and undermine the credibility of
the Code. The Illinois Criminal Code currently includes five laws
that likely would not withstand challenge under the First
Amendment. These laws are the Flag Desecration Act, 109 the
Draft Card Mutilation Act, 110 the Violent Video Games Law,"1 the
Sexually Explicit Video Games Law,"12 and Disorderly Conduct at
a Funeral or Memorial Service.113
The retention of
unconstitutional provisions in a criminal code creates confusion
and uncertainty concerning what constitutes criminal conduct and
does not further the purpose of the Criminal Code. The CLEAR
Commission should have proposed to eliminate these provisions
11 4
from the Code, because they violate the First Amendment.
A.

The Flag DesecrationAct

The United States Supreme Court has issued two recent
decisions reversing convictions under flag desecration statutes as
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 11 5 Following those
decisions, it is doubtful that any flag desecration act could be
enforced consistent with the First Amendment. Despite that, the
Illinois Criminal Code still contains a provision - the Illinois Flag
Desecration Act - criminalizing the desecration of the State and
United States flags. That Act should be repealed.

109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/0.01-5 (2006).
110. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 595/0.01-1 (2006).
111. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-1 (2006).
112. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12B-1 (2006).
113. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6 (2006).
114. The CLEAR Commission took some steps to eliminate potentially
unconstitutional provisions from the Code. For example, the Commission
recommended repeal of a portion of the unlawful visitation statute, 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10-5.5(h), that the Illinois Supreme Court has held
unconstitutional. See CLEAR Commission, supra note 12, at 23. Likewise,
the Commission recommended repeal of portions of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act and the Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate Act which have
been held unconstitutional. Id. at 92, 102. A federal court sitting in Illinois
held that 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 570/315 was unconstitutional in Knoll Pharm.
Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d. 615, 622 (N.D. Ill. 1999). The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 590/1(d) unconstitutional in
Pearson v. Edgar, 153 F.3d 397, 405 (7th Cir. 1998).
115. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989).
In each case the Court held the statute at issue
unconstitutional as applied to the individual defendant, but declined to hold
the statute unconstitutional on its face.
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The Illinois Flag Desecration Act prohibits placing for display,
exposing to public view, manufacturing or selling a State or
United States flag with any word, design or advertisement placed
on the flag or affixed to the flag. 116 That behavior is punishable by
imprisonment for up to thirty days, a fine of up to $1500, or
both. 117 The Act also criminalizes publicly mutilating, defacing,
defiling or trampling a State or United States flag or intentionally
displaying either of those flags on the ground. 118 That behavior is
punishable by imprisonment for one to three years, a fine up to
$25,000, or both. 119 Mutilation of a flag, which includes flag
burning, has received the most interpretation and scrutiny by
courts.
State legislatures first enacted laws prohibiting the
destruction of flags in the late 1800s. 120 Those statutes were
enacted for two reasons: to prevent the commercial use of the flag,
and to prevent its desecration. 121 The latter concern stemmed
from the fact that during the political campaigns of those times,
supporters of competing political parties sometimes desecrated the
United States flag to show contempt for the other party. 122 Illinois
first passed a statute criminalizing conduct concerning destruction
of flags in 1899, but that statute was held unconstitutional a year
later by the Illinois Supreme Court. 123 The legislature re-enacted
a flag desecration act in 1907.124 That statute evolved into the
125
current Illinois Flag Desecration Act.
The United States Supreme Court has held that laws
prohibiting the desecration of flags, like the Illinois Act, infringe

116. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/1 (2006) (The sale and manufacture
subsection is very broad and prohibits exposing to public view, manufacturing,
selling, exposing for sale, giving away, possessing for sale or to give away for
any purpose, "any article or substance, being an article of merchandise, or a
receptacle of merchandise or article or thing for carrying or transporting
merchandise upon which has been printed, painted, attached, or otherwise
placed a representation of any such flag, standard, color, or ensign, to
advertise, call attention to, decorate, mark or distinguish the article or
substance on which so placed ... ").
117. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-3 (2006); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-9-1(a)(3)
(2006).
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/1.

119. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 515-8-1(a)(7) (2006); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-91(a)(1).
120. People v. Lindsay, 282 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ill. 1972).
121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. Id. at 434.
125. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 620/0.01-5 (2006).
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on free speech rights in certain contexts. In 1989, in Texas v.
Johnson, the United States Supreme Court overturned a
conviction under Texas law for burning an American flag, holding
that the conviction violated the First Amendment. 126 The Texas
law "expressly prohibited only those acts of physical desecration
'that the actor knows will seriously offend' onlookers."'127 Mr.
Johnson burned the flag as part of a political demonstration that
coincided with a meeting of the Republican Party to re-nominate
President Reagan. 128 In determining whether the statute was
constitutional, the Court first decided whether Johnson's act of
burning the flag was expressive conduct within the realm of First
Amendment protection. 129 All action taken with respect to a flag is
not necessarily expressive, and the Court was required to consider
the conduct in the context in which it occurred. 130 The Court found
that the defendant's actions were expressive given his reason for
burning the flag and the events surrounding the burning, namely
a demonstration coinciding with the Republican Party's
meeting.' 3 '

The Court next considered whether the State's interest in
punishing that behavior could justify the law's intrusion upon
First Amendment rights. The State presented two interests:
preventing breaches of the peace, and preserving the flag as a
symbol of nationhood and national unity.1 32 No breach of the
peace occurred with the defendant's demonstration, leading the
Court to conclude that this case did not involve the State's interest
to maintain order. 33 Moreover, the Court rejected the State's
claim holding:
[T]hat an audience that takes serious offense at particular
expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace and that the
expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do not
countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize
that a principal "function of free speech under our system of
government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger." It would be odd indeed to conclude both that "if it is the
speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for

126. 491 U.S. at 418.
127. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315.
128. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 410.
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according it constitutional protection," and that the government
may ban the expression of certain disagreeable ideas on the
unsupported presumption that their very disagreeableness will
provoke violence.134

The Court also determined that the conduct at issue burning the flag to express dissatisfaction with the policies of the
Federal Government - did not fall under the "fighting words"
exception because "no reasonable on-looker would have regarded
Johnson's generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the
policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or
135
an invitation to exchange fisticuffs."
The Court then considered whether the State's interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity could justify the
conviction. 136 The Court held that it could not. It found that:
[T]he State's asserted interest 'in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity,' was an interest related 'to the
suppression of free expression' within the meaning of O'Brien
because the State's concern with protecting the flag's symbolic
meaning is implicated 'only when a person's treatment of the flag
137
communicates some message.'

The Court stated that the "bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment... is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."'138 Thus, the Court found the statute
unconstitutional as applied to that defendant, and held that his
139
conviction could not stand.
After Johnson, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of
1989.140 This federal Act replaced the existing federal flag-burning
law. Congress expressed concern that the law on the books at that
time might be held unconstitutional after Johnson because it
addressed the content of the speech at issue, as did the Texas law
at issue in Johnson.41 The 1989 Act was written more broadly
than the prior federal statute or the Texas law at issue in
Johnson, and did not target "expressive conduct on the basis of the
content of its message."'142 The Act was immediately challenged in

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 408-09.
Id. at 409.
Id.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
Id. at 420.
18 U.S.C. § 700 (2006).
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314 n.3.
Id. at 315.
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United States v. Eichman, which involved several individuals who
had been arrested and convicted for setting fire to American flags
143
in protest of the Act and other government policies.
The Supreme Court found the federal Flag Protection Act of
1989 to be unconstitutional as applied to the defendants in that
case. 144 The Court rejected the government's argument that it has
an interest in 'protecting the physical integrity of the flag under
all circumstances' in order to safeguard the flag's identity 'as the
unique and unalloyed symbol of the nation."' 145 The Court
concluded:
Although the Flag Protection Act contains no explicit content-based
limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear
that the Government's asserted interest is "related 'to the
expression,' 146 and concerned with the content of
suppression of free
147
'

such expression."

The Court held the Act was unconstitutional as applied to the
defendants:
Although Congress cast the Flag Protection Act in somewhat
broader terms than the Texas statute at issue in Johnson, the Act
still suffers from the same fundamental flaw; it suppresses
expression out of concern for its likely communicative impact.
Despite the Act's wider scope, its restriction on expression cannot be
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech."14

8

The Court also declined to reconsider its determination in
Johnson that flag burning does not fall under the "fighting words"
exception to the First Amendment. 149 In conclusion, the Court
stated:
We are aware that desecration of the flag is deeply offensive to
many. But the same might be said, for example, of virulent ethnic
and religious epithets, vulgar repudiations of the draft, and
scurrilous caricatures ....

Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes

the very freedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth
150
revering.
Under Johnson and Eichman, the Illinois Flag Desecration

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 312.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 317-18 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 318-19.
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Act is unconstitutional. It prohibits conduct similar to the conduct
addressed in the Texas and federal laws, and, like those statutes,
''suppresses expression out of concern for its likely communicative
impact."151 Moreover, the interests which the State has advanced
to justify that statute are the same as the interests presented as
justification by the governments, and rejected by the Court, in
152

Johnson and Eichman.

Despite the likelihood that the Illinois Flag Desecration Act is
unconstitutional, Illinois police continue to charge persons under
the statute. In 2003, a Jonesboro man pleaded guilty to the
offense and served two weeks in prison for burning an American
flag outside of his residence. 153 At that time, a spokesperson for
the American Civil Liberties Union commented on the arrest and
expressed surprise that the offense could still be prosecuted given
the Supreme Court's rulings concerning other flag desecration
statutes. 54 In 1989, a Virginia schoolteacher was arrested and
charged with felony desecration when she stepped on an American
flag that was part of an exhibit at the School of the Art Institute of
Chicago. 15 5 After much public debate and protest, the State nolle
prossed the charges against the schoolteacher.15 6 Cases that have
been prosecuted under the Illinois Flag Desecration Act, dating
before the Supreme Court's decisions, have involved minimal fines
and prison sentences and the majority of those convictions were

151. Id. at 317.
152. In Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740, 744 (S.D. Ill. 1971), the
State asserted that the Act was necessary to preserve public peace and to
preserve the flag as a symbol of unity. When the Court scrutinized those same
interests in Johnson, it found the State's interest in preserving the flag as a
symbol was related to the suppression of expression and therefore
unconstitutional. 491 U.S. at 420. In Sutherland, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the Illinois flag desecration statute as applied to the
defendants where the defendants had burned a flag in front of a federal
building. 323 F. Supp. at 741.
153. Downstate flag burner gets 14-day sentence, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2003, at
13.
154. Id.
155. A. Dahleen Glanton, Tourist Teacher Charged with Stepping on Flag,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5, 1989, at 3.
156. See Interview by Jennifer Dlugosz with Lawrence Schaner, Esq., in
Chicago, Ill. (Nov. 28, 2007) (statements of the defense attorney representing
the schoolteacher who was charged criminally for stepping on a flag). The
exhibit was controversial at the time. Memorandum from Interview with L.
Schaner, Esq. by Jennifer Dlugosz, (Nov. 28, 2007) (on file with author). When
the schoolteacher stepped on the flag, a Vietnam veteran was standing close
by and stated he wanted to make a citizens arrest. Id. Two plainclothes police
officers standing nearby escorted the schoolteacher to the police station. Id.
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ultimately overturned.15 7
B. Draft CardMutilation Act
The CLEAR Commission likewise should have recommended
repeal of the Draft Card Mutilation Act. The Act infringes on free
speech, is outdated and is duplicative of federal law.
The Draft Card Mutilation Act makes it a crime to knowingly
destroy or mutilate a valid registration certificate or any other
valid certificate issued under the Military Selective Service Act of
1967.158 A violation of the statute is a Class 4 felony and is
punishable by imprisonment for one to three years, a fine of up to
$25,000, or both. 159 Illinois enacted the Draft Card Mutilation Act
in 1968.160 No other state in the nation currently criminalizes that
behavior.
Draft registration is governed by the federal
government's Selective Service System. Federal law prohibits
knowingly destroying or mutilating any registration certificate or
any alien's certificate of nonresidence. 161
If there ever was a legitimate government interest in
prosecuting those who mutilate draft cards, that interest no longer
exists. It does not appear that Illinois has ever sought to enforce
the Act. There is not a single reported Illinois case addressing the
Draft Card Mutilation Act, and the authors have not been able to
uncover any evidence of recent arrests under the law. 162
The federal government last used the draft in 1973 at the end
of the Vietnam War. 163 In 1975, registration for the draft was
suspended; however, in 1980, President Carter reinstated draft
registration. 164 Currently, males over eighteen are required to

157. See Lindsay, 282 N.E.2d at 431-32 (reporting that defendants were
fined seventy-five dollars); see also People v. Von Rosen, 147 N.E.2d 327, 32829 (Ill. 1958) (noting that defendants were fined fifty dollars and the Illinois

Supreme Court reversed their convictions); People v. Meyers, 321 N.E.2d 142,
142-43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (detailing that defendant was fined fifty dollars, and

the appellate court reversed judgment).
158. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 595/1 (1993).
159. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (1993); 730 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/5-91(a)(1)(1995).
160. Draft Card Mutilation Act, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 595/1 (1993) (effective
Aug. 20, 1968).
161. 50 U.S.C. § 462 (2006).

162. A search of Illinois periodicals and internet sources confirmed this
conclusion.
163. Burt Constable, If Military Draft Returns, This Suburban Office Knows
Where We Are, DAILY HERALD, Jan. 9, 2003, at 11.
164. Debra Pickett, Hell no, we won't go... although you never know, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at 14.
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register with the Selective Service. 165 However, the draft has not
been used in over thirty years - since the early 1970s the military
has been all-volunteer. 166 The Selective Service reports that it no
longer issues draft cards; rather, it issues proof of registration that
has "nothing to do with the draft."'167 The Selective Service
removed the requirement that an individual carry proof of
registration at all times in 1974.168
Moreover, the Justice
Department is not currently prosecuting men who fail to
register. 69 Given that draft cards are no longer issued, the
Selective Service no longer requires men to carry proof of
registration, and failure to register is no longer prosecuted; the
statute is unnecessary.
Nor could the Act withstand constitutional scrutiny after
Johnson.170 The only time the Supreme Court considered a case
involving the mutilation of a draft card was almost forty-years ago,
before Johnson. In 1968, in United States v. O'Brien, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a prosecution for burning a
draft card under federal law. 171 The Court upheld the law,
reasoning that Congress "has a legitimate and substantial interest
in preventing [a draft card's] wanton and unrestrained destruction
and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people
who knowingly and willfully destroy or mutilate them." 72 The
Court emphasized that the defendant was convicted solely for
7
making his registration unavailable. 3
Today, because registrants are no longer required to carry
proof of registration, the "legitimate and substantial interest"
found in O'Brien no longer exists. Thus, the State's only possible
remaining reason to prohibit draft card mutilation would be to
suppress the content of that expressive conduct, which is
unlawful.174
Indeed, in Eichman the Court cited "vulgar
repudiations of the draft" as an example of conduct which is
offensive to some, but nonetheless protected by the First

165. Id.
166. Constable, supra note 163, at 11.

167. Selective

Service

System,

http://www.sss.gov/FSdraftcd.htm

(last

visited Nov. 23, 2007).

168. Id.
169. Constable, supranote 163, at 11.
170. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420.
171. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

172. Id. at 380.
173. Id.
174. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416 (reasoning that a state cannot suppress
expressive conduct that does not threaten disturbing the peace).
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Amendment. 175
The Draft Card Mutilation Act would not
withstand constitutional challenge after Johnson and Eichman.
Finally, if draft certificates were ever used again, anyone who
mutilated a certificate could still be prosecuted for that offense by
the federal government if the federal law is found to pass
constitutional muster. The Illinois Act is pointless, and thus
should be repealed.
When CLEAR Commissioners discussed the Draft Card
Mutilation Act, many expressed the view that the statute should
be repealed. The Commission determined not to recommend
repeal out of concern for political reaction. Despite the view of
many Commissioners that the Act should be repealed, the
Commission decided to recommend that the Act be retained, but
relocated to Article 26, Disorderly Conduct. The Commission
should have recommended repeal of the Act. It protects no
legitimate State interest and could not withstand constitutional
challenge.
C. Recent UnconstitutionalLegislation
The Flag Desecration Act and the Draft Card Mutilation Act
are not the only statutes in the Illinois Code that infringe on First
Amendment rights.
Between 2005 and 2006, the Illinois
legislature created three laws that it knew would likely be found
unconstitutional. Two of those laws were held unconstitutionally
vague before they even went into effect: the Violent Video Games
Law and the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law. 176 The CLEAR
Commission should have recommended the repeal of those
statutes. The third law, Disorderly Conduct at a Funeral or
Memorial Service, has not yet been challenged, but likely will face
tough constitutional scrutiny because of its potential to infringe
upon free speech rights.
In 2005, the Illinois legislature passed two statutes
regulating the sale and rental of video games. 177 Debates on the

175. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318-19.
176. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-1 to 12A-25 (2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/12B-1 to 12B-35 (2007).
177. See Violent Video Games Law, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12A-15 (2006)
(prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors and also
requires labeling of all violent video games); see also Sexually Explicit Video
Games Law, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12B-15 (2006) (restricting the sale or
rental of sexually explicit video games to minors, requiring all such games to
be labeled, and requiring the posting of video games rating system near the
area where games are displayed, at the information desk, and at the point of
purchase).
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floor of the House and Senate revealed concerns among several
legislators that those laws would be found unconstitutional and
that the State would be forced to defend a challenge to the laws'
constitutionality and pay attorneys' fees when the lawsuit was lost
in federal court. 178 Senator Cullerton noted federal courts had
already struck down similar statutes enacted in other states and
had awarded hundreds of thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees
against the states. 179 Senator Jacobs stated he would vote for the
bill because it was a political bill, "[wie know it's going to get killed
by the courts and it may cost us a half million dollars to fight it,
but I'm going to do it, just so that I don't have it show up in a mail
piece." 180 Despite concern about its constitutionality, the bill
passed the Senate 52-5, with one senator voting present.18 1 A
similar debate on constitutionality occurred in the House, but the
bill passed with ninety-one representatives voting in favor,
nineteen voting against, six voting present and two
18 2
representatives not voting at all. '
Before the video game laws went into effect, a challenge was
made to their constitutionality.
In Entertainment Software
Association v. Blagojevich, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois permanently enjoined the enforcement
of both statutes, finding that portions of the statutes violated the
First Amendment.' 83 The CLEAR Commission was aware of the
decision in Entertainment Software Association, but did not
recommend the repeal of those provisions; instead, the CLEAR

178. See Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, at 118-129, 94th Gen. Assembly (May
19, 2005) (detailing debates of the various views that the act is
unconstitutional, not created well, and a limitation on free speech); see also
Transcript of Ill. H.R. Debate, at 19-85, 94th Gen. Assemb. (Mar. 16, 2005)
(observing debates in the House over concerns that courts have found no link
between videos and violence, there is no compelling state interest, and the act
is an attempt to restrict the sale of video games).
179. Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, supra note 179, at 122-23 (statement of Sen.
Cullerton) (noting that the state of Washington, city of Indianapolis, and city
of St. Louis had similar statutes which were struck down by federal courts).
180. Id. at 126 (statement of Sen. Jacobs).
181. Transcript of ill. S. Debate, supra note 179, at 129.
182. Transcript of Ill. H.R. Debate, supra note 179, at 85.
183. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1083 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Specifically, the court
found that the definition of "violent video games" under the Violent Video
Games Law was unconstitutionally vague and that the statute was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose. Id. at 1077.
The court also found that the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law, and
particularly the law's definition of "sexually explicit" were vague and not
narrowly tailored. Id. at 1080. The court held that the statute's sale, rental,
and check-out provisions were unconstitutional. Id. at 1081.
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Commission merely recommended that they be relocated within
the Criminal Code.184 The Commission should have recommended
their repeal.
In 2006, the Illinois legislature passed another statute of
questionable constitutionality that criminalizes disorderly conduct
at a funeral or memorial service.18 5 The statute makes it a crime
knowingly to perform specific disruptive behavior within twohundred feet of any funeral site thirty minutes before or after a
funeral.18 6 Congress has passed a similar law, the Respect for
America's Fallen Heroes Act, which applies to certain cemeteries
on federal property.18 7 Similar statutes have been passed in
several other states as well.188 The Illinois legislature, and many
other states, passed those statutes in part as a response to the
actions of a group from Kansas that has picketed at military
funerals and has yelled hateful messages at the families of the
fallen soldiers during the services as part of a protest against
homosexuality.1 8 9
Scholars and legislators have questioned
whether those statutes are constitutional. 190 Legislative debate
surrounding the passing of the Illinois statute revealed that
legislators were cognizant of potential constitutional problems and
attempted to draft a statute that could pass constitutional
muster. 191

184. The CLEAR Commission recommended the relocation of the Violent
Video Games Law to the end of Article 12, Bodily Harm, and the relocation of
the Sexually Explicit Video Games Law to the end of Article 11, Sex Offenses.
185. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-6 (2006).

186. Id. This statute prohibits loud singing, chanting, noisemaking, visual
images that convey fighting words or threats, and obstructing the entrance or
exit of a funeral site. Id.
187. 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
188. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-230 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4015 (1996);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (Supp. 2007); MINN. STAT. § 609.501
(Supp. 2008); Mo. REV. STAT. § 578.501 (LexisNexis 2007); 18 PA. STAT. ANN.
7517 (Supp. 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.055 (Supp. 2007).
189. Rebecca Bland, Note, The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act:
Conflicting Interests Raise Hell with the First Amendment, 75 U.M.K.C. L.

REV. 523, 523 (2007). The picketers are part of the Westboro Baptist Church
of Topeka, Kansas. Id. They believe that God is punishing America for
tolerating homosexuality. Id. The picketers often display signs and scream at
grieving families. Id.
190. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David K. Hudson Jr., A funeral or free
speech? Laws Against Funeral Protests Strike at the FirstAmendment, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006; see also Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, at 30-31, 94th Gen.
Assembly (Apr. 5, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wilhelmi) (arguing that people can

speak out in different locations without disrespecting the right to be laid to
rest with honor in a peaceful atmosphere).
191. See Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, supra note 189, at 130-38 (detailing the
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The disorderly conduct at a funeral statute raises
constitutional concerns because it infringes on free speech rights
in public places, is vague and overbroad, and can be applied to
First, the statute prohibits
punish content-based speech.1 92
disorderly conduct within two-hundred feet of any funeral site,
which can include public cemeteries, sidewalks, streets and parks.
Statutes that prohibit free speech in public places are subject to
careful scrutiny. 193 Second, in its effort to ensure constitutionality,
the legislature drafted the statute broadly and made no distinction
between the messages conveyed at the protests. While the Illinois
law seeks to prevent disrespectful protests, the law is so broadly
drafted that it would also prevent the Patriot Guard Riders, a
group of motorcyclists who shield families from the offending
protests, from appearing at funeral sites. The law also does not
include an exception for cemetery or funeral workers. Because the
law does not include those exceptions, arrests and prosecutions
may become arbitrary, subjecting those who display offensive
messages to a greater likelihood of being targeted. Third, the
legislature passed that statute, in part, in response to the actions
of a specific group of protesters conveying a specific message, and
sought to prohibit the expression of offensive ideas that the group
has conveyed. 194 The Court in Johnson emphasized that the
government "may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
' 95
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."'
Under Johnson, when challenged, this crime du jour will face
tough constitutional scrutiny.
In addition to the constitutional problems that statute poses,
the statute is also unnecessary because Illinois law already
criminalizes disorderly conduct, intimidation, hate crime and
Depending upon the facts of the situation, a
trespass. 96
combination of those laws could be used to prosecute unruly
protesters.
The CLEAR Commission should have recommended the
repeal of the Flag Desecration Act, the Draft Card Mutilation Act,

Act's possible infringement on free speech).

192. See Collins, supra note 190 (discussing the potential constitutional
problems with funeral protest laws).
193. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988).

194. Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, 94th Gen. Assembly (Apr. 5, 2006), at 29-30
(statement of Sen. Wilhelmi), available at, http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts

/strans94 /09400097.pdf.
195. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
196. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (2006) (disorderly conduct); 720 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 5/12-6 (2006) (intimidation); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (2006) (hate
crime); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-3 (2006) (criminal trespass to real property).
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the Violent Video Games Law, the Sexually Explicit Video Games
Law and Disorderly Conduct at a Funeral or Memorial Service
because all of the statutes violate the First Amendment. The
legislature's passage and retention of unconstitutional legislation
undermines
the credibility of the Code.
Defending
unconstitutional legislation is costly and the purpose of the
legislation - which is on shaky constitutional footing in the first
place - is defeated when it cannot successfully be enforced. Those
laws do not belong on the books and should be repealed.
IV. STATUTES SHOULD NOT BE CREATED TO CRIMINALIZE CONDUCT

THAT IS UNLIKELY TO BE REPEATED OR IS BETTER REGULATED
THROUGH CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES

Statutes that regulate consumer products do not belong in a
criminal code, nor do statutes that are tailored to address single,
notorious events that are not likely to be repeated. This section
discusses several such statutes that the CLEAR Commission
retained in its final recommendation and argues that their repeal
would improve the Code.
Criminal laws are often created to protect the safety of the
public, but there is a point where regulation is better left to
consumer protection laws.
Experience shows that legislators
sometimes create criminal laws in response to a single incident
that draws public outcry. Because those types of laws focus solely
on very specific - often isolated - conduct, it is unlikely that the
targeted conduct will be repeated. Promulgation and retention of
those statutes needlessly complicates the Criminal Code. The
Illinois Criminal Code contains several laws that would be better
left to consumer product regulation, including the Sale of Maps
Act, the Video Sales and Movie Rentals Act, Sale of Yo-Yo
Waterballs, and the Abandoned Refrigerator Act. The CLEAR
Commission should have recommended that those statutes be
repealed.
In Illinois, if one is caught selling current Illinois publications
or highway maps published by the Secretary of the State he or she
could face up to six months of jail time. 197 Maps published by the
Secretary of State are available free at state visitor centers. 198
Legislative history reveals that the legislature passed the Sale of

197. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 340/1-340/2 (2006); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-3
(2006).
198. Transcript of Ill. S. Debate, 80th Gen. Assembly, at 122 (May 17, 1977)
(statement of Sen. Vadalabene), availableat http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts
/strans80/ST051777.pdf
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Maps Act to prohibit the for-profit sale of state publications. 199
While this Bill passed the Senate 52-1, Senator Knuppel remarked
that it was unnecessary:
Like so many bills we've acted on here today, this is a lot to do about
nothing. I don't know where you're going to find a State's Attorney
that's going to handle a case at the county's expense to prosecute
somebody who sold two or three dollars worth of road maps. This is
another law that we don't need anymore than what we just
passed.

200

Despite Senator Knuppel's wise objection to the bill, only he
voted against its passage. 201 There have been no reported arrests
or prosecutions under the statute since the law was passed in 1977
- just as Senator Knuppel predicted.
The CLEAR Commission
recommended that this statute be transferred into a miscellaneous
offenses article within the Criminal Code.
Instead, the
Commission should have recommended repeal.
The Code also contains a provision that criminalizes the sale
of yo-yo waterballs. 2 2 A yo-yo waterball is a soft, rubber-like ball
that is filled with liquid and attached to a cord. 203 A violation of
the statute is punishable by a fine of up to $1,001.204 In 2006,
Illinois was the first of two states to create a criminal law for the
sale of the toy. The legislature created that statute in response to
public outcry concerning the safety of the toy in light of reported
strangulations and eye injuries to children. 205 Representative
Coulson framed the statute as a means to prevent deaths and
injuries. 20 6
The statute passed the Illinois House of
Representatives by a vote of 108-3.207 In the Senate, Senator
Schoenberg appealed to those "interested in child safety" to obtain
votes for the bill, describing how the toy easily wraps around a
child's neck and noting that the liquid inside the toy is
flammable. 20 8
The Bill passed the Illinois Senate with no

199. Id.
200. Id. at 124 (statement of Sen. Knuppel).
201. Id. (statement of Sen. Rock)
202. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-21.7 (2006).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Dangers of Water Yo-Yo's, http://www.dangersofwateryoyos.
com (providing an example of this public outcry) (last visited Mar. 28, 2008).
206. Transcript of Ill. H.R. Debate, 94th Gen. Assembly, at 56 (May 5, 2005)
(statement of Rep. Coulson), availableat http://ilga.gov/house/transcripts/
htrans94/09400047.pdf.
207. Id.
208. Transcript of Ili. S. Debate, 94th Gen. Assembly (Apr. 13, 2005)
(statement of Sen. Schoenberg), available at, http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/
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opposition.209

The CLEAR Commission decided to recommend that the
statute be moved from the Criminal Code into Chapter 815,
Business Transactions, but did not recommend its repeal. There
are no other statutes in the Criminal Code that criminalize
behavior with regard to children's toys, let alone specific toys. The
CLEAR Commission's decision to move that statute outside of the
Criminal Code was a step in the right direction, but did not go far
enough.
In 1986, the legislature enacted the Video Sales and Movie
Rental Act. 210 Under that Act, it is a crime in Illinois to sell or
rent at retail a video movie without an official rating clearly
A violation of the statute is
displayed on the outside. 211
punishable by up to thirty days imprisonment, a fine of up to
Transcripts from the General Assembly
$1,500, or both. 212
proceedings reveal no debate on the Act.213 The Act is yet another
law that has existed for many years but never has been
enforced. 214 Despite that, the CLEAR Commission recommended
retaining the Act in the Criminal Offenses chapter. 215 The Act
should be repealed.
Under the Illinois Abandoned Refrigerator Act, a person can
be imprisoned for thirty days if he or she discards a refrigerator
with an attached door in an area accessible to children. 216 An

strans94/09400029.pdf.
209. Id. The votes cast for the Bill were 55 Yeas and 0 Nays. Id.
210. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 395/3 (2006).

211. Id. There is an exception to the law if the video movie has not been
given an official rating. Id.
212. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-3 (2006); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-9-1(a)(3)
(2006).

213. Legislators debated this Bill in the 84th General Assembly (1985-86). A
review of the Senate and House of Representative Transcripts for House Bill
1270 showed no debate.
214. No case law exists discussing any reported enforcement of this law.
215. The Commission recommended that the Act be transferred into a
miscellaneous offenses article. See CLEAR Commission, supra note 12, at 101.
216. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (2006). The Abandoned Refrigerator Act
criminalizes abandoning or discarding a refrigerator, icebox, or ice chest that
has the capacity of at least one and one-half cubic feet in any place accessible
to children, if the appliance has an attached lid or door that can be fastened.
Id. Illinois is not the only state to punish that behavior; several other states,
including Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania enacted similar laws in the 1950s.
FLA. STAT. § 823.07 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.29 (2006); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 6502 (2006). Some states have more expansive statutes
prohibiting one from discarding any airtight container that meets certain
criteria. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.100 (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 270.10 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.29.

2008]

The CriminalLaw Edit, Alignment and Reform Initiative

773

owner or lessee of the property who knowingly permits that
behavior can be penalized as well under the Act.217 Legislators
apparently designed that law to protect children from suffocating
by climbing inside a discarded refrigerator (but not a washer,
dishwasher or other appliance) and closing the door. 218 Although
the Act went into effect in 1953, there is no recorded case law
involving the statute, and the CLEAR Commission found no
evidence that anyone has ever been prosecuted for violating it.219
While it makes sense to protect children from danger, the
restriction of the statute to refrigerators is curiously narrow and
imposing criminal sanction in this context seems severe. The
CLEAR Commission did not consider repealing the Act; rather it
expanded the law to include punishment for the improper disposal
of "other airtight or semi-airtight containers." 220 The Commission
should have recommended that the legislature repeal that neverbefore enforced Act.
The statutes discussed above are just a few examples of
criminal laws that punish behavior better regulated through civil
law, namely consumer protection statutes. There are more. For
example, in Illinois, a person can face criminal charges for not
installing the proper wattage light bulbs within a certain distance
from an entryway on a multi-unit building, 221 for not including the
price of tax in a gasoline advertisement, 222 or for using a trapeze or

217. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1 (2006).
218. No legislative transcripts discussing the debate of this law exist because
legislative transcripts containing debate and discussion of laws passed in the
House and Senate first became available for the 77th General Assembly (197172).
219. A search of Illinois periodicals and internet sources confirmed this
conclusion.
220. The CLEAR Commission recommended the transfer of the statute into
the same article as other nuisance provisions. CLEAR Commission, supra
note 12, at 87. The CLEAR Commission also recommended the addition of the
mental state "knowingly" to the statute, requiring that the offender knowingly
discard the appliance in a place accessible to children. Id.
221. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 655/1 (2006). The Outdoor Lighting Installation
Act requires the owner of a multiple dwelling to install and maintain lights in
the entry way. Id. The Act requires certain wattage bulbs and a certain
number of lights depending on the frontage of the building, and requires that
the lights be kept on from sunset to sunrise. Id. A violation of that act is
punishable by no more than thirty days imprisonment, a fine of up to $1500,
or both. Id. 655/3. The CLEAR Commission recommended retaining that act
within the Criminal Offenses Chapter; that mental states be added; and that
CLEAR
it be transferred to the Public Nuisance Offenses Article.
Commission, supra note 12, at 87.
222. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/1 (2006). The Gasoline Price Advertising Act
criminalizes advertising the price of gas upon any sign unless it includes all
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tightrope without a safety net. 223 Neither the Legislature nor the
public envisions prisons full of refrigerator disposers, yo-yo ball
purveyors, video salespersons, and circus performers. As these
examples demonstrate, the Criminal Code has been cluttered with
laws criminalizing inherently non-criminal behavior for years.
While many of these statutes seek to protect public safety, that
goal can be achieved through the civil law - a criminal code
should be reserved for the most serious offenses that warrant
224
criminal sanction.
While the CLEAR Commission could have gone further by
recommending the repeal of these and other "flavor of the month"
crimes, that would have been only part of the solution to the
proliferation of crimes du jour. Legislators must be part of the
solution as well. Legislators should scrutinize proposed criminal
laws and determine whether the conduct at issue truly should be
subject to criminal sanction, whether it is already prohibited
under existing statutes, and whether consumer and public safety
would be better protected through consumer product regulation.
Legislators must be able to see past political expediency and
reserve the Criminal Code for sanctioning conduct that truly
endangers the public and is deserving of criminal sanction.
Although the CLEAR Commission failed to provide a perfectly
clean slate from which the legislature may work, its work can

taxes and corresponds to the price appearing on the pump. Id. The identity of

the product must also be included with the accurate price. Id. A violation of
that statute is a petty offense, the punishment for which can include a fine of
up to $1000. Id. 305/2. The statute's legislative history reveals that this law
was passed to prevent gas stations from advertising the price of gas then
putting the amount of tax in small print, and to prevent discrepancies between
the price advertised on a sign and the price otherwise paid. Transcript of Ill.
S. Debate, 80th Gen. Assembly, at 13 (June 28, 1977) (statement of Sen.
Berman), availableat http://ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans80/
ST062877.pdf. The CLEAR Commission recommended that this statute be
moved from the Criminal Offenses Chapter to the Business Transactions
Chapter in the Illinois Compiled Statutes. CLEAR Commission, supra note
12, at 106.
223. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/1 (2006). The Aerial Exhibitors Safety Act
prohibits the private exercise or public performance of certain aerial activities
without a safety net if the performer is at risk to fall from a height of over
twenty feet. Id. In addition to punishing the performer, the Act also provides
for sanctions against the owner, agent, lessee, or other person in control of the
operation. Id. 530/2. A violation of the Act is punishable by imprisonment for
up to one year, a fine of up to $2,500, or both. Id. 530/3. The CLEAR
Commission recommended that this law be retained in the Criminal Code, but
transferred to the article on nuisance. CLEAR Commission, supra note 12, at
100.
224. Luna, supra note 5, at 1.
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serve as a beginning for reform in this area.
V. CONCLUSION

A criminal code should be logical, easy to understand, and
provide clear notice of the law. The CLEAR Commission was
formed to ensure that the Illinois Criminal Code would do just
that. While the CLEAR Commission took several steps in the
right direction, the changes the Commission recommended could
have reached farther and have brought more significant changes
to the Illinois Criminal Code. A criminal code should be up to date
with the times. A criminal code should not contain statutes that
are never enforced, or statutes that have been held, or likely will
be held, unconstitutional. A criminal code should be limited to the
most serious offenses that society needs to deter. The CLEAR
Commission failed to fully implement those ideals.
Archaic laws such as adultery and fornication should be
removed from the Criminal Code. Statutes regulating the private,
consensual, non-commercial sexual behavior between adults are
likely unconstitutional and seek to impose criminal sanctions to
enforce notions of morality. The CLEAR Commission should have
stood its ground and recommended repeal of the adultery and
fornication statutes in Illinois. Conversely, if Commissioners
determined the repeal of those statutes would jeopardize the
Criminal Code Bill as a whole, the Commission should have
adopted separate recommendations to repeal those two statutes.
The retention of archaic and unenforced statutes in a criminal
code serves no purpose but to clutter the Code and lead to
confusion.
Likewise, laws that infringe on free speech and cannot
constitutionally be enforced do not belong in a criminal code. The
CLEAR Commission should have recommended the repeal of the
Flag Desecration Act, the Draft Card Mutilation Act, the video
game laws and the disorderly conduct at a funeral service law. As
discussed above, those statutes are rarely prosecuted and infringe
on free speech.
Finally, the Code should have been scrubbed clean of "crimes
du jour" that were created in response to specific events not likely
to recur, are never prosecuted, and address conduct better
regulated through consumer protection laws. Since the last
revision of the Illinois Criminal Code in 1961, the legislature has
passed several statutes regulating behavior that would better be
the subject of consumer product regulation. 225 The regulation of

225. See supra notes 198-224 and accompanying text (discussing criminal
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dangerous toys, unrated movies or the sale of maps does not
belong in the Criminal Code and leads to confusion as to the
purpose of a criminal code. The CLEAR Commission should have
recommended the repeal of more of those statutes. A criminal code
should be aimed at punishing the most serious and reprehensible
conduct that society seeks to deter and the behavior prohibited by
those statutes is better regulated elsewhere.
The CLEAR Commission undertook a tough task to update
the entire Criminal Code in Illinois and made many
recommendations that will result in significant improvements to
the Illinois Criminal Code. The work of the CLEAR Commission,
spanning over two years, should be applauded. It is a significant
step in the process of updating and clarifying the Illinois Criminal
Code, but the Commission should have gone farther.

statutes that regulate behavior, which would better be left solely controlled by
consumer product regulation); see also Robinson, supra note 6, at 634-35
(providing a general discussion on "legislative hyperactivity").

